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Abstract 
 
A defined contribution pension plan allows consumption to be redistributed from the plan 
member’s working life to retirement in a manner that is consistent with the member’s personal 
preferences. The plan’s optimal funding and investment strategies therefore depend on the 
desired pattern of consumption over the lifetime of the member. 
 
We investigate these strategies under the assumption that the member has an Epstein-Zin utility 
function, which allows a separation between risk aversion and the elasticity of intertemporal 
substitution, and we also take into account the member’s human capital. 
 
We show that a stochastic lifestyling approach, with an initial high weight in equity-type 
investments and a gradual switch into bond-type investments as the retirement date approaches 
is an optimal investment strategy. In addition, the optimal contribution rate each year is not 
constant over the life of the plan but reflects trade-offs between the desire for current 
consumption, bequest and retirement savings motives at different stages in the life cycle, 
changes in human capital over the life cycle, and attitude to risk. 
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Optimal Funding and Investment Strategies in Defined 
Contribution Pension Plans under Epstein-Zin Utility 
 
 
1  Introduction 
1.1 The role of the pension plan in allocating consumption across the 
life cycle 
A typical individual’s life cycle consists of a period of work followed by a period of 
retirement.  Individuals therefore need to reallocate consumption from their working life 
– when the lifetime’s income is earned – to retirement – when there might be no other 
resources available, except possibly a subsistence level of support from the state. A 
defined contribution (DC) pension plan can achieve this reallocation in a way that is 
consistent with the preferences of the individual plan member. There are three key 
preferences to take into account.  
 
The first relates to the desire to smooth consumption across different states of the nature 
in any given time period. The second relates to the desire to smooth consumption across 
different time periods. Saving for retirement involves the sacrifice of certain consumption 
today in exchange for, generally, uncertain consumption in the future. This uncertainty 
arises because both future labour income and the returns on the assets in which retirement 
savings are invested are uncertain. The plan member therefore needs to form a view on 
both the trade-off between consumption in different states of nature in the same time 
period and the trade-off between consumption in different time periods. Attitudes to these 
trade-offs will influence the optimal funding and investment strategies of the pension 
plan.  
 
In a DC pension plan, the member allocates part of the labour income earned each year to 
the pension plan in the form of a contribution and, thus, builds up a pension fund prior to 
retirement. Then, on retirement, the member uses a proportion of the accumulated 
pension fund to purchase a life annuity. The decisions regarding the contribution rate 
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each year before retirement (i.e., the funding strategy) and the annuitisation ratio (i.e., the 
proportion of the fund at retirement that is used to purchase a life annuity) are both driven 
by the member’s preference between current and future consumption, as well as the 
desire to leave a bequest, the third key preference that we need to take into account. 
Should the member die before retirement, the entire accumulated pension fund will be 
available to bequest; after retirement, only that part of the residual pension fund that has 
not been either annuitised or spent can be bequested.    
 
The investment strategy (i.e., the decision about how to invest the accumulated fund 
across the major asset categories, such as equities and bonds) will influence the volatility 
of the pension fund and, hence, consumption in different time periods, and so will be 
influenced by the member’s attitude to that volatility.  
 
In this paper, we investigate the optimal funding and investment strategies in a DC 
pension plan.
1
 To do this, we use a model that differs radically from existing studies in 
this field in three key respects. 
 
The first key feature of the model is the assumption of Epstein-Zin recursive preferences 
by the plan member. This enables us to separate relative risk aversion (RRA) and the 
elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS). Risk aversion is related to the desire to 
stabilise consumption across different states of nature in a given time period (e.g., an 
individual with a high degree of risk aversion wishes to avoid consumption uncertainty in 
that period, and, in particular, a reduction in consumption in an unfavourable state of 
nature) and the EIS measures the desire to smooth consumption over time (e.g., an 
individual with a low EIS wishes to avoid consumption volatility over time, and, in 
particular, a reduction in consumption relative to the previous time period).
2
  Thus, risk 
                                                 
1 This research focuses on the investment and funding strategies for a DC plan during the accumulation 
stage and the only form of saving we allow is pension saving. Non-pension saving, housing-related 
investments and post-retirement investment strategies are beyond the scope of this study.  
 
2 The EIS is defined as 
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aversion and EIS are conceptually distinct and, ideally, should be parameterised 
separately. In this paper, we consider four different types of member according to 
different RRA and EIS combinations, as shown in Table 1.1.  
 
 
Table 1.1 Pension plan member types 
 High RRA (risk averse) Low RRA (risk tolerant) 
Low EIS 
(likes 
consumption 
smoothing) 
 
● risk-averse member 
who dislikes 
consumption volatility 
over time 
● low equity allocation, 
particularly as 
retirement approaches 
● e.g., low income 
member with 
dependants 
 
 
● risk-tolerant member 
who dislikes 
consumption volatility 
over time 
● high equity allocation at 
all ages 
● e.g., low income 
member without 
dependants 
 
High EIS 
(accepts 
consumption 
volatility) 
 
● risk-averse member 
who does not mind 
consumption volatility 
over time 
● low equity allocation, 
particularly as 
retirement approaches 
● e.g., high income 
member with 
dependants 
 
 
● risk-tolerant member 
who does not mind 
consumption volatility 
over time 
● high equity allocation at 
all ages 
● e.g., high income 
member without 
dependants 
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where 1tc   is consumption in period t1 and ( )1tU c′   is the marginal utility of 1tc , etc. The sign and size of 
the EIS reflects the relationship between the substitution effect and income effect of a shock to a state variable, such 
as an increase in the risk-free interest rate. The substitution effect is always negative, since current consumption 
decreases when the risk-free rate increases because future consumption becomes relatively cheap and this encourages 
an increase in savings. The income effect will be positive if an increase in the risk-free rate (which induces an increase 
in wealth) leads to an increase in current consumption; it will be negative otherwise. If the income effect dominates, the 
EIS will be negative and an increase in the risk-free rate leads to an increase in current consumption. If the substitution 
effect dominates (which is the usual assumption), the EIS will be positive and an increase in the risk-free rate leads to a 
decrease in current consumption. If the income and substitution effects are of equal and opposite sign, the EIS will be 
zero and current consumption will not change in response to an increase in the risk-free rate: in other words, 
consumption will be smooth over time in response to interest rate volatility. 
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Within the commonly used power utility framework, the coefficient of relative risk 
aversion (RRA) is the reciprocal of EIS (see, for example, Campbell and Viceira (2002)). 
This restriction has been criticised because it does not reflect empirical observations. For 
example, based on the consumption capital asset pricing model,
3
 Schwartz and Torous 
(1999) disentangle these two concepts using the term structure of asset returns. Using US 
data, their best estimate for RRA is 5.65 (with a standard error of 0.22) and their best 
estimate of the IES is 0.226 (with a standard error of 0.008). Thus, a high RRA is 
associated with a low level of EIS, but the estimated parameter values do not have the 
reciprocal relationship assumed by power utility. Blackburn (2006) also rejects the 
reciprocal relationship on the basis of a time series of RRA and EIS parameters estimated 
from observed S&P 500 option prices for a range of different expiry dates between 1996 
and 2003.
4
 
 
The second key feature of the model is the recognition that the optimal investment 
strategy will depend not just on the properties of the available financial assets, but also on 
the plan member’s human capital.  A commonly used investment strategy in DC pension 
plans is “deterministic lifestyling”. With this strategy, the pension fund is invested 
entirely in high risk assets, such as equities, when the member is young. Then, at some 
arbitrary date prior to retirement (e.g., 10 years), the assets are switched gradually (and 
usually linearly) into lower risk assets such as bonds and cash. However, there has been 
no strong empirical evidence to date demonstrating that this is an optimal strategy.  
 
If equity returns are assumed to be mean reverting over time, then the lifestyle strategy of 
holding the entire fund in equities for an extended period prior to retirement may be 
justified, as the volatility of equity returns can be expected to decay over time (as a result 
of the effect of “time diversification”). However, there is mixed empirical evidence about 
whether equity returns are genuinely mean reverting: Blake (1996), Lo and Mackinley 
(1988) and  Poterba and Summers (1988) find supporting evidence for the UK and US, 
                                                 
3   Breeden’s 1979 extension of the traditional CAPM which estimates future asset prices based on aggregate 
consumption rather than the return on the market portfolio. 
4  In particular, Blackburn (2006) found that, over the period 1996 to 2003, the level of risk aversion changed 
dramatically whilst the level of elasticity of intertemporal substitution stayed reasonably constant.   
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while Howie and Davies (2002) and Kim et al (1991) find little support for the 
proposition in the same countries. We would therefore not wish an optimal investment 
strategy to rely on the assumption of mean reversion holding true in practice. 
 
A more appropriate justification for a lifestyle investment strategy comes from 
recognising the importance of human capital in individual financial planning. Human 
capital (i.e., the net present value of an individual’s future labour income) can be 
interpreted as a bond-like asset in which future labour income is the “dividend” on the 
individual’s implicit holding of human capital. Young pension plan members therefore 
implicitly have a significant holding of bond-like assets and, thus, should weight the 
financial element of their overall portfolio towards equity-type assets.
5
 But to date, there 
has been no quantitative research exploring the human capital dimension in a DC pension 
framework. 
 
This paper presents an intertemporal model to solve the life-cycle asset allocation 
problem for a DC pension plan member. The model assumes two assets (a risky equity 
fund and a risk-free cash fund), a constant investment opportunity set (i.e., a constant 
return on the risk-free asset, and a constant expected return and volatility on the risky 
asset) and stochastic labour income. We consider two aspects of labour income risk: the 
volatility of labour income and the correlation between labour income and equity returns 
which determines the extent to which labour income affects portfolio choice (e.g., a 
positive correlation reduces the optimal asset allocation to equities). 
 
The third key feature of the model concerns the annuitisation decision at retirement. A 
member with a strong “bequest” savings motive will not wish to annuitise all the 
accumulated pension wealth. In our model, the member chooses to annuitise a proportion 
of the accumulated pension fund at retirement by buying a life annuity which will 
generate a return linked to bonds. We denote this proportion the “annuitisation ratio”. 
This ratio is chosen to maximise the expected utility level at retirement when annuity 
                                                 
5  Note this argument might not be appropriate for more entrepreneurial individuals whose pattern of future labour 
income growth corresponds more to equity than to bonds. 
 7
income replaces labour income. The member invests the residual wealth that is not 
annuitised in higher returning assets in line with the RRA. The member can draw an 
income from the residual wealth to enhance consumption in retirement, but, unlike the 
life annuity, the residual wealth can be bequested when the individual dies.  
 
Before considering the model in more detail, we will review Epstein-Zin utility. 
 
 
1.2  Epstein-Zin utility  
The classical dynamic asset allocation optimisation model was introduced by Merton 
(1969, 1971), and shows how to construct and analyse optimal dynamic models under 
uncertainty. Ignoring labour income, in a single risky asset and constant investment 
opportunity setting, the optimal portfolio weight in the risky asset for an investor with a 
power utility function ( ) ( )
1
( ) 1U W W
−
= −
γ
γ  (where W  is wealth and γ  is the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion) is given by: 
2
µ
α
γσ
=                                                              [1] 
 
where µ and 2σ  are the excess return on the risky asset and the variance of the return on 
the risky asset, respectively. The investment opportunity set is assumed to be constant. 
 
Equation [1] is appropriate for a single-period myopic investor, rather than a long-term 
investor such as a pension plan member. Instead of focusing on the level of wealth itself, 
long-term investors focus on the consumption stream that can be financed by a given 
level of wealth. As described by Campbell and Viceira (2002, p37), “they consume out of 
wealth and derive utility from consumption rather than wealth”. Consequently, current 
saving and investment decisions are driven by preferences between current and future 
consumption. 
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To account for this, Epstein and Zin (1989) proposed the following discrete-time 
recursive utility function,
6
 which has become a standard tool in intertemporal investment 
models, but has not hitherto been applied to pension plans: 
( ) ( )
1
1 1
1 1
1
1
1 1
11
ϕ ϕ
γϕ γβ β
− −
−
− −
+
 
  = − +  
 
 
t t t tV C E V                                   [2] 
where 
• tV  is the utility level at time t , 
• β  is the individual’s personal discount factor for each year, 
• tC  is the consumption level at time t , 
• γ  is the coefficient of relative risk aversion (RRA), and 
• ϕ  is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS). 
 
The recursive preference structure in [2] is helpful in two ways: first, it allows a multi-
period decision problem to be reduced to a series of one-period problems (from time t  to 
time 1+t ); and second, as mentioned previously, it enables us to separate RRA and EIS.  
 
Ignoring labour income, for an investor with Epstein-Zin utility, there is an analytical 
solution7 for the optimal portfolio weight in the risky asset given by: 
( )1 1
2 2
cov ,1
1
µ
α
γσ γ σ
+ +− = + − × 
 
t t tt
t
t t
R V
                                     [3] 
 
This shows that the demand for the risky asset is based on the weighted average of two 
components. The first component is the short-term demand for the risky asset (or myopic 
demand, in the sense that the investor is focused on wealth in the next period). The 
second component is the intertemporal hedging demand, which is determined by the 
                                                 
6 Recursive utility preferences focus on the trade-off between current-period utility and the utility to be derived from all 
future periods. Kreps and Porteus (1978) first developed a generalised iso-elastic utility function which distinguishes 
attitudes to risk from behaviour toward intertemporal substitution. Following the KP utility function, Epstein and Zin 
(1989, 1991) proposed a discrete-time recursive utility function that allows the separation of the risk aversion 
parameter from the EIS parameter. Duffie and Epstein (1992) then extended the Epstein-Zin discrete recursive utility in 
a continuous-time form called a stochastic differential utility (SDU) function.  
7 For more details, see Merton (1973) and Campbell and Viceira (2002). 
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covariance of the risky asset return with the investor’s utility per unit of wealth over time. 
Thus, ignoring labour income, the optimal portfolio weights are constant over time, 
provided that the investment opportunity set remains constant over time (i.e., t =µ µ  and 
2 2
t =σ σ  in [3]). 
 
In a realistic life-cycle saving and investment model, however, labour income cannot be 
ignored. It is risky and cannot be capitalised and traded. But, allowing for labour income 
volatility in the optimisation process means that an analytical solution for the optimal 
asset allocation cannot be obtained. To address this, the recent literature has employed a 
number of numerical methods
8
 to approximate the solution of the dynamic portfolio 
optimisation problem. 
 
In the presence of income risk, the optimal portfolio weight in the risky asset is not 
constant, but instead follows a lifestyle strategy, as shown by Coco et al. (2005). This can 
be explained as follows: human capital or wealth can be thought of as the expected net 
present value (NPV) of future labour income. Thus, an individual’s labour income can be 
seen as the dividend on the individual’s implicit holding of human capital. The ratio of 
human to financial wealth9 is a crucial determinant of the life-cycle portfolio composition. 
In early life, as shown in Figure 1.1, this ratio is large since the individual has had little 
time to accumulate financial wealth and expects to receive labour income for many years. 
Given that long-term average labour income growth is of a similar order of magnitude as 
average long-run interest rates in the UK over the last century, as explained in Cairns et 
al. (2006), labour income can be thought of as an implicit substitute to investing in the 
                                                 
8 By far, the most popular approach is value function iteration. Specifically, this involves the discretisation of the state 
variables by setting up a standard equally-spaced grid and solves the optimisation for each grid point at the next-to-last 
time period. The expectation term in the resulting Bellman equation is approximated by using quadrature integration 
and then the dynamic optimisation problem can be solved by backward recursion. It is possible that the accumulated 
state variable values from the previous time period are not represented by a grid point, in which case, an interpolation 
method (e.g., bilinear, cubic spline, etc.) must be employed to approximate the value function. However, this approach 
requires knowledge of the distribution of each of the shocks to the process, so that appropriate quadrature integration 
(e.g., Gauss quadrature) can be used. Furthermore, this approach cannot handle a large number of state variables. To 
overcome these limitations, Brandt et al. (2005) proposed a simulation method based on the recursive use of 
approximated optimal portfolio weights. The idea is to estimate asset return moments using a large number of 
simulated sample paths, and then to approximate the value function using a Taylor series expansion. If the return is 
path-dependent, it is necessary to regress the return variable on the simulated state variables from previous time period, 
before using the Taylor expansion with conditional return moments.  
9 In our model, the only source of financial wealth is pension wealth, and we use these terms interchangeably. 
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risk-free asset. Thus, younger individuals have a significant holding in this non-tradable 
risk-free asset and, therefore, should allocate most of their financial wealth to the risky 
asset to keep the overall portfolio composition constant, as suggested by Equation [3] 
above. As they grow older, individuals accumulate more financial wealth and draw down 
human capital.
10
 They should therefore rebalance their financial portfolio towards risk-
free assets as age increases.  
 
 
Figure 1.1 – Decomposition of total wealth over the life cycle 
 
 
More recently, life-cycle asset allocation models with a stochastic labour income process 
have been extended to include the use of a recursive utility function to allow a separation 
of  RRA and EIS by, for instance, Weil (1989) and Campbell and Viceira (2002). By 
including a fixed first-time risky-asset entry cost and adopting Epstein-Zin utility, Gomes 
and Michaelides (2005) present a life-cycle asset allocation model to explain the 
                                                 
10 In our model, the value of human capital will be zero at the end of age 65. The salary is assumed to be paid at the 
start of the year, so the human capital at 65 in Figure 1.1 is equal to the individual’s final salary.  
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empirical observations of low stock market participation and moderate equity holdings 
for participants
11
.  
 
Turning to DC pension plans, most of the existing literature investigates their optimal 
dynamic asset allocation strategy by assuming a fixed contribution rate (e.g., 10% of 
salary per annum prior to retirement) and maximising the utility of the replacement ratio 
(i.e., pension as a proportion of final salary) at retirement (for example, Cairns et al. 
(2006)) or by minimising the expected present value of total disutility 12  prior to 
retirement (for example, Haberman and Vigna (2002)). The EIS is implicitly assumed to 
be zero and there is no facility for adjusting the contribution rate in response to changes 
in salary level or in asset performance. However, in practice, most DC plans allow 
members to make additional voluntary contributions, and often set upper and lower limits 
on the contribution rate per annum. 
 
Our aim in this study is to investigate the optimal asset allocation strategy for a DC plan 
member with Epstein-Zin utility, so that an individual member’s investment strategy 
depends on the pattern of preferred consumption levels over the member’s entire lifetime. 
We also derive the optimal profile of contribution rates over the accumulation stage of a 
DC plan. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the discrete-
time model with Epstein-Zin utility, including the parameter calibration process and 
optimisation method used. In Section 3, we generate simulations of the two key state 
variables (i.e., wealth and labour income) and derive the optimal funding and investment 
strategies for the DC pension plan; we also conduct a sensitivity analysis of the results. 
Section 4 concludes. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 Gomes and Michaelides (2005, page 871) argue that the less risk-averse investors have a weaker incentive to pay the 
fixed entry cost of equity investment, and therefore stock market participants in aggregate tend to be more risk averse. 
 
12 The disutility is normally defined using the deviation of actual fund level from interim and final target fund levels.  
 12
 
2 The model 
 
2.1 The model structure and optimisation problem 
We propose a two-asset discrete-time model with a constant investment opportunity set. 
To ensure conformity with a DC pension plan, a number of constraints need to be 
specified: 
(i) pension wealth can never be negative, 
(ii) in any year prior to retirement, consumption must be lower than labour income, 
(iii) short selling of assets is not allowed, 
(iv) members are not allowed to borrow from future contributions.13  
 
Members are assumed to join the pension plan at age 20 (denoted time 0=t  below) 
without bringing in any transfer value from a previous plan and the retirement age is 
fixed at 65. We work in time units of one year and members are assumed to live to a 
maximum age of 120ω = . 
 
2.1.1 Preferences 
We assume the plan member possesses the discrete-time recursive utility function 
proposed by Epstein and Zin (1989): 
( ) ( )
1
1 11 1
1 1
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1
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γ γ
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+ + + + + + + +
 
             = − + × + − × ×   −        
  
t
t t t t t t t
W
b
V p C E p V p b    [4] 
 
                                                 
13 Some studies have assumed that the member can borrow from future contributions (i.e., to incorporate a loan in the 
portfolio equal to the present value of future contributions). In this way, Boulier et al. (2001) and Cairns et al. (2006) 
investigate the optimal asset allocation of DC pension plan with guaranteed benefit protection. However, there are 
arguments against the use of this assumption. In most cases, this would not be allowed in practice. Also, the loan 
amount depends on assumptions about the level of future contributions and, in practice, there can be a lot of uncertainty 
about future contributions. 
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where 
• 20+tV  is the utility level at time t  (or age 20+ t ), 
• 20+tW  is the wealth level at time t , 
• 20+tC  is the consumption level at time t , 
• γ  is the coefficient of relative risk aversion (RRA), 
• ϕ  is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS), 
• β  is the discount factor for each year, and 
• 20+tp  is the one-year survival probability at time t  (i.e., the probability that a 
member who is alive age 20 + t  survives to age 20 1+ +t ). 
 
The parameter b  is the “bequest intensity” and determines the strength of the bequest 
motive. If a member dies during the year of age 20+ t  to 20 1+ +t , the deceased member 
will give the remaining wealth at the end of the year, 
120 ++tW , a utility measure of 
( ) ( )
1
20 1 1tb W b
−
+ +× −
γ
γ . Thus, a higher value of b  implies that the member has a 
stronger desire to bequest wealth on death. 
 
In the final year of age ( )1,ω ω− , where we have 1 0ω− =p , equation [4] reduces to: 
1
1 11 1
1 1
1
1
1 1 1
1
ϕ ϕ
γ γ
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ω ω ωβ γ
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− −
−
− − −
 
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W
b
V C E b                                    [5] 
which provides the terminal condition for the utility function.  
 
2.1.2 Financial assets 
We assume that there are two underlying assets in which the pension plan can invest: 
(i) a risk-free asset (i.e., a cash fund), and 
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(ii) a risky asset (i.e., an equity fund). 
 
The risk-free asset yields a constant rate of interest r , and the return on the risky asset in 
year t  is given by: 
20 20µ ε+ += + +t tR r                                                    [6] 
where 
• µ  is the (constant) risk premium on the risky asset, and 
• 20 1,20ε σ+ += ×t tZ , where σ is the (constant) volatility of the risky asset and 1,20+tZ  
is an independent and identically distributed (iid) standard Normal random 
variable 
 
Whilst not necessarily corresponding with the real world, the simplified assumption of iid 
returns on the risky asset considerably facilitates the numerical method used. 
 
2.1.3 Labour and pension income 
Before retirement, the member receives an annual salary at the start of each year and 
contributes a proportion π t  of this into the pension plan at time t . We adopt the 
stochastic labour income process used in Cairns et al. (2006) which is illustrated in 
Figure 2.1. The growth rate in labour income prior to retirement is given by: 
20 1 20
20 1 1,20 2 2,20
20
σ σ+ + ++ + +
+
−
= + + × + ×t tt I t t
t
S S
I r Z Z
S
                            [7] 
where 
• Ir  is the long-term average annual real rate of salary growth (reflecting 
productivity growth in the economy as a whole), 
• 
20+tS  is the “career salary profile” (CSP), or salary scale, at time t , so that the 
term ( )20 1 20 20t t tS S S+ + + +−  reflects the promotional salary increase between time 
t  and time 1+t , 
• 
1σ  represents the volatility of a shock that is correlated with equity returns, 
• 2σ  represents the volatility of the annual rate of salary growth, and 
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• tZ +20,2  is an iid standard Normal random variable. 
 
Equations (6) and (7) are subject to a common stochastic shock, 1,20+tZ , implying that the 
correlation between the growth rate in labour income and equity returns is given by 
( )2 21 1 2+σ σ σ .  
 
Figure 2.1 – Labour income process 
 
 
Following the work of Blake et al. (2007), we use a quadratic function to model the CSP: 
2
20 1 2
4
1 1 1 3*
45 45 45
+
    = + × − + + × − + +        
t
t t t
S h h                          [8] 
 
On retirement at age 65, the member is assumed to annuitise a proportion k  of the 
accumulated pension fund by buying a life annuity, where k , the annuitisation ratio, is 
chosen to maximise the member’s utility level at retirement. The amount of annuity 
income received depends on the accumulated wealth level at retirement, the annuitisation 
ratio and the price of a life annuity. In this model, the price of a life annuity is calculated 
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using the risk-free return on the cash fund, so it is fixed over time and no annuity risk is 
considered.  After retirement, the member invests the residual wealth that is not 
annuitised. Retirement income therefore comes from two sources: the annuity and 
possible withdrawals from the residual fund until death. 
 
2.1.4 Wealth accumulation 
Before retirement, the growth in the member’s pension wealth will depend on the 
investment strategy adopted, the investment returns on both the risk-free asset and the 
risky asset, and the chosen contribution rate. 
 
The contribution rate at time t  is given by ( )20 20 20 20t t t tY C Y+ + + += −π  (for 0 44≤ ≤t ), 
where 20+tY  is the labour income level at time t . We require the contribution rate to be 
non-negative, so that 20 20+ +≥t tY C  before retirement. The contribution rate is allowed to 
vary over time, so that consumption in any period can adjust to changes in income level 
and investment performance.  
 
We also need to impose the restriction 
20 0+ ≥tW  (for 1000 ≤≤ t ), to ensure that the 
wealth level is always non-negative at each age over the life cycle. 
 
A proportion,
20α +t , of the member’s pension account is assumed to be invested in the 
risky asset at time t . Then, for 0 43≤ ≤t  (i.e., up to and including the year prior to 
retirement), we have the following recursive relationship for the wealth process: 
( ) ( )20 1 20 20 20 20 201π α µ ε+ + + + + + + = + × + + + t t t t t tW W Y r                             [9] 
 
As mentioned above, we assume that that short selling of assets is not allowed and 
therefore impose the restriction that 200 1α +≤ ≤t .  
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At the start of the year in which the member is aged between 64 and 65, the member 
receives the final salary payment and makes the final contribution to the pension fund. So, 
we have:  
( ) ( )65 64 64 64 64 641π α µ ε−  = + × + + + W W Y r                                 [10] 
 
At the end of this year, the member retires and chooses the annuitisation ratio k , giving a 
residual wealth on retirement at exact age 65 of ( )65 651 −= − ×W k W . The annuitisation 
ratio k  is chosen to maximise the utility level at retirement. This control variable does 
not appear in the utility function, but rather in the wealth constraint in the retirement year. 
 
After retirement, the member invests a proportion 20α +t  (for 45≥t ) of the residual 
wealth (i.e., that which was not annuitised) in the risky asset and receives annuity 
payments rather than labour income at the start of each year, provided that the member is 
still alive. This implies that the recursive relationship for the wealth accumulation process 
at this stage of the member’s life cycle is given by: 
                        ( )6520 1 20 20 20 20
65
1 α µ ε
−
+ + + + + +
 ×
 = + − × + + +   
 ɺɺ
t t t t t
k W
W W C r
a
                 [11] 
where 65aɺɺ  is the price of a life annuity at age 65 (and, hence, 65 65k W a
−× ɺɺ  represents the 
annual annuity income after retirement). 
 
Finally, we must constrain consumption after retirement such that 
( )20 20 65 65t tC W k W a
−
+ +≤ + × ɺɺ .   
 
 
2.1.5 The optimisation problem and solution method  
The model has three control variables: the asset allocation at time t , 20α +t , the 
consumption level at time t , 20+tC , and the annuitisation ratio at retirement, k .  
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The optimisation problem is then: 
( )
20 20
20
, ,
max
α + +
+
t t
t
C k
E V  
subject to the following constraints:  
(i) for 0 43≤ ≤t , we have: 
a) a wealth accumulation process satisfying: 
( ) ( )20 1 20 20 20 20 201 0π α µ ε+ + + + + + + = + × + + + ≥ t t t t t tW W Y r , 
b) an allocation to the risky asset satisfying 10 20 ≤≤ +tα , and 
c) a contribution rate satisfying 20 0π + ≥t ; 
 
(ii) for 44=t , we have: 
a) a wealth accumulation process satisfying: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )65 64 64 64 64 641 1 0π α µ ε = − × + × + + + ≥ W k W Y r , 
b) an allocation to the risky asset satisfying 640 1α≤ ≤ , 
c) a contribution rate satisfying 64 0π ≥ , and 
d) an annuitisation ratio at age 65 satisfying 10 ≤≤ k ; 
 
(iii) and, for 45≥t , we have: 
a) a wealth accumulation process satisfying: 
( )6520 1 20 20 20 20
65
1 0α µ ε
−
+ + + + + +
 ×
 = + − × + + + ≥   
 ɺɺ
t t t t t
k W
W W C r
a
, 
b) an allocation to the risky asset satisfying 10 20 ≤≤ +tα , and 
c) consumption satisfying 6520 20
65
−
+ +
 ×
≤ + 
 ɺɺ
t t
k W
C W
a
. 
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The Bellman equation at time t  is: 
 
( )
( ) ( )
20 20
20 20 20
1
1 1
1 1
1 1
20 1
1
1
1
20 20 20 20 20 1 20
, ,
,
max 1 1
1
ϕ ϕ
γ γ
γϕ
α
β β
γ+ +
+ + +
− −
− −
+ +
−
−
+ + + + + + +
 
             = − + × + − × ×   −        
  
t t
t t t
t
t t t t t t
C k
J W Y
W
b
p C E p J p b
 [12] 
 
An analytical solution to this problem does not exist, because there is no explicit solution 
for the expectation term in the above expression. Instead, we must use a numerical 
solution method to maximise the value function and derive the optimal control 
parameters. We use the terminal utility function at age 120 to compute the corresponding 
value function for the previous period and iterate this procedure backwards, following a 
standard dynamic programming strategy.   
 
To avoid choosing a local maximum, we discretise the control variables (i.e., asset 
allocation, consumption and annuitisation ratio) into equally spaced grids and optimise 
them using a standard grid search. As an important step in implementing the stochastic 
dynamic programming strategy, we need to discretise both the state space and shocks in 
the stochastic processes (i.e., equity return and labour income growth) first. Wealth and 
labour income level are discretised into 30 and 10 evenly-spaced grid points, respectively, 
in the computation.
14
 Also, the shocks in both the equity return and labour income growth 
processes are discretised into 9 nodes.
15
 
 
                                                 
14  Clearly, the choice concerning the number of nodes is subjective, but we felt that this choice represents an 
appropriate trade-off between accuracy and speed of computation. 
15  Again, 9 nodes represents a balance between accuracy and computing time, and is a standard setting in the existing 
literature.  
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The expected utility level at time t  is then computed using these nodes and the relevant 
weights attached to each (i.e., Gauss quadrature weights and interpolation nodes).
16
 The 
advantage of using this set of nodes is that the state variables can be computed more 
quickly and precisely; however, because we have a fine grid on the control variables and 
a much coarser grid on the shocks, we may have some state variable values outside of the 
grid points in the next time period. In this case, cubic spline interpolation is employed to 
approximate the value function. While this approach does not significantly reduce the 
accuracy of the results obtained, use of a much finer grid for the shocks in the equity 
return and labour income growth processes would significantly increase computing time, 
as mentioned previously. 
 
For each age 20+ t  prior to the terminal age of 120, we compute the maximum value 
function and the optimal values for the control variables at each grid point. Substituting 
these values in the Bellman equation, we obtain the value function of this period, which 
is then used to solve the maximisation problem for the previous time period. Details of 
the dynamic programming and integration process are given in Appendix 1. The 
computations were performed in MATLAB.
17
  
 
2.2 Parameter calibration 
We begin with a standard set of baseline parameter values (all expressed in real terms) 
presented in Table 2.1. 
 
The constant net real interest rate, r , is set at 2% p.a., while, for the equity return process, 
we consider a mean equity premium, µ , of 4% p.a. and a standard deviation, σ , of 20% 
p.a.. Using an equity risk premium of 4% p.a. (as opposed to the historical average of 
around 6%) is a common choice in recent literature (e.g., Fama and French (2002), 
Gomes and Michaelides (2005)). This more cautious assumption reflects the fact that the 
historical equity risk premium might be higher than can reasonably be expected in future, 
and thus will reduce the weight given to equities in the optimal portfolios obtained. We 
                                                 
16
 For more details, see Judd (1998, page 257-266). 
17
 http://www.mathworks.com/products/matlab/. The code is available on request from the authors. 
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use the projected PMA92 table
18
 as the standard male mortality table, and hence, using a 
(real) interest rate of 2% p.a., the price of a whole life annuity from age 65 is 15.87. 
 
Table 2.1 Baseline parameter values 
Asset returns 
 
 Preference parameters  
risk-free rate, r  0.02 RRA, γ  5 
equity premium, µ  0.04 EIS, ϕ  0.2 
volatility, σ  0.2 bequest intensity, b  1 
  discount factor, β  0.96 
    
Mortality  Labour income process  
mortality table PMA92  starting salary, 
20Y  
1 
  average salary growth, 
Ir  
0.02 
Annuity  volatility of shock correlated with 
equity returns, 1σ  
 
0.05 
annuity price, 65ɺɺa  
15.87 
(based on 
PMA92 and a 
risk-free rate of 
0.02) 
volatility of annual rate of salary 
growth, 
2σ  
 
0.02 
  
1h  
-0.276 
  
2h  
0.75835 
 
 
We start by presenting results for what might be considered as a relatively standard plan 
member, with RRA of 5γ = , EIS of 0.2ϕ =  and discount factor 0.96β = . 19  As 
mentioned above, the bequest intensity, b , plays an important role in life-cycle saving 
and investment. We set b  equal to unity in the baseline case (which represents a 
moderate level of bequest saving motive). We later conduct a sensitivity analysis on these 
parameter values.  
 
The starting salary is normalised on unity. All absolute wealth and income levels are 
measured in units of the starting salary. In line with post-war UK experience, the 
annualised real growth rate of national average earnings is assumed to be 2% p.a. with a 
                                                 
18 PMA92 is a mortality table for male pension annuitants in the UK based on experience between 1991 and 1994; here, 
we use the projected rates for the calendar year 2010, i.e., the table PMA92(C2010), published by the Continuous 
Mortality Investigation (CMI) Bureau in February 2004.  
19 This parameter constellation is common in the literature (e.g., Gomes and Michaelides (2004)). The values of RRA 
and EIS are also consistent with power utility for the baseline case.    
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standard deviation of 2% p.a. (i.e., 0.02Ir =  and 2 0.02=σ ). Following the work of 
Blake et al. (2007), we estimate the CSP parameters 1h  and 2h  using average male salary 
data (across all occupations) reported in the 2005 Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings.  
The estimated values are 1 0.276= −h  and 2 0.75835=h  (see [8]). 
 
 
3 Results 
3.1 Baseline case 
3.1.1 Optimal asset allocation assuming no bequest motive or labour income risk 
As suggested by equation [3] above, the optimal portfolio composition should be constant 
when there is no bequest motive and labour income risk is ignored. Figure 3.1 shows the 
optimal equity weight for the final time period (i.e., year of age 119 to 120) with no 
bequest motive. As expected, we can see that when the accumulated wealth level is large 
(and labour income is small in comparison), the optimal asset allocation is close to the 
result suggested in equation [3], so that we have: 
 120 120
2 2
cov( , )1
1 0.2
µ
α
γσ γ σ
  −
= + − × ≈ 
 
R V
 
 
This result shows that we can approximate an analytical solution numerically reasonably 
accurately, thereby justifying the use of our grid search numerical method. 
 
3.1.2 Simulation output 
The output from the optimisation exercise is a set of optimal control variables (i.e., asset 
allocation, 20α +t , and consumption level, 20+tC ) for each time period and the optimal 
annuitisation ratio, k , at retirement age 65. We generate a series of random variables for 
both the equity return and labour income shocks, and then generate 10,000 independent 
simulations of wealth and labour income levels.  
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Figure 3.1 – Optimal equity allocation for the final time period 
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Figure 3.2 shows the simulation means of labour income and optimal wealth and 
consumption levels for ages 20, 21, …, 120, and Figure 3.3 shows the consumption 
profile on a larger scale. We have bequest and retirement saving motives in this model. In 
the early years of the life cycle (i.e., up to age 45 or so), wealth accumulation is driven by 
the bequest intensity (i.e., the extent of the desire to protect dependants if the member 
dies) and by the attitude to risk (i.e., the degree of aversion to cutting consumption in 
unfavourable states).
20
 Consumption increases smoothly during this period. Then, as the 
member gets older, the retirement motive becomes more important as the member 
recognises the need to build up the pension fund in order to support consumption after 
retirement. From age 45 to the retirement age of 65, the retirement savings motive 
dominates and the pension fund grows significantly. As a result, consumption remains 
almost constant during this period.  
 
                                                 
20 This will become clearer in sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2. 
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After retirement, there is a large fall in consumption compared with the period 
immediately prior to retirement and thereafter consumption remains stable for the 
remainder of the member’s lifetime. Evidence presented in Banks et al (1998) shows that 
consumption tends to fall after retirement. Part of this is explained by the fact that work-
related expenses such as travel and clothes no longer need to be incurred. Part is 
explained by the fact that precautionary balances need to be maintained to pay for lumpy 
expenditures such as car repairs or home maintenance, given that working to pay for 
these expenses is no longer an option. Part is also explained by the fact that retired people 
tend to stay at home more and so spend less on high-cost items, such as restaurant meals 
and   holidays. We do not attempt to model these complex issues in a formal way. Instead, 
we try to capture them in the post-retirement consumption constraint 
( )( )20 20 65 65t tC W k W a−+ +≤ + × ɺɺ  (i.e., for 45≥t ), given in section 2.1.4 above. 
Consumption after retirement is therefore subject to a cash-in-hand constraint and cannot 
exceed the sum of pension income and unannuitised wealth. The constraint is tighter the 
higher the fraction, k,  of pension wealth the member chooses to annuitize at age 65. 
Given that k is a control variable, Figure 3.3 shows the optimal reduction in consumption 
in retirement when k is chosen optimally (i.e., to maximise ( )64E V ).  
 
The size of the fall in consumption at retirement when there is a cash-in-hand constraint 
will be influenced by the level of non-pension wealth, such as discretionary savings or 
housing. Since non-pension wealth does not need to be annuitized, it acts as a buffer that 
can be used to smooth life-cycle consumption. Non-pension wealth is outside the scope 
of the present paper. 
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Figure 3.2 – Mean of simulated wealth, consumption and income 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3 – Mean of consumption 
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Figure 3.4 shows the expected NPV of total future labour income (i.e., human capital). 
We can see that human capital increases until about age 35. This is because of the very 
high rate of salary growth in the early years (relative to the discount rate applied to future 
labour income).  
 
Figure 3.4 – Human capital 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5 shows six possible optimal asset allocation profiles for equities at each age 
before retirement, 20α +t . Each profile coincides with a particular quantile from the 
distribution of outcomes from 10,000 simulations.These profiles are consistent with the 
investment strategy called “stochastic lifestyling”, first outlined in Cairns et al (2006), 
with a high equity weighting at younger ages and a gradual switch from equities to the 
risk-free financial asset as the retirement age approaches. Prior to around age 35, the 
member should invest all financial wealth in the risky asset, because the implicit holding 
in the non-tradable riskless asset (i.e., human capital) is increasing, as illustrated in 
Figure 3.4.  However, after age 35, human capital starts to decline. The member should 
then begin to rebalance the financial wealth portfolio towards the risk-free financial asset 
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to compensate for the decline in human capital. This is because the risk-free financial 
asset and human capital are substitutes, with the degree of substitutability inversely 
related to the correlation between labour income growth and equity returns, 
( )2 21 1 2+σ σ σ .  
 
The investment strategy is known as “stochastic lifestyling” because the optimal equity 
weighting over the life cycle depends on the realised outcomes for the stochastic 
processes driving the state variables, namely labour income and the risky financial asset. 
The profiles have a similar shape which can be characterised as three connecting (and 
approximately) linear segments. The first is a horizontal segment involving a 100% 
equity weighting (approximately) from age 20 to an age somewhere in the range of 40-47. 
The second is a steep downward segment that involves a reduction in equities to 
somewhere between 10-40% over a seven year period. The third is a more gentle 
downward sloping segment that reduces the equity weighting to somewhere between 0-
10% by the retirement age. It is important to note that the profiles in Figure 3.5 are not, 
however, consistent with the more traditional “deterministic lifestyling” strategy, which 
involves an initial high weighting in equities with a predetermined linear switch from 
equities to cash in the period leading up to retirement (typically the preceding 5 or 10 
years).  
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Figure 3.5 – Optimal equity allocation prior to retirement 
 
 
Figure 3.6 plots six quantiles from the distribution of optimal contribution rates, 
corresponding to the optimal asset allocation strategies shown in Figure 3.5. Considering 
the profile corresponding to the mean, the initial annual contribution rate at age 20 is just 
under 8% p.a.. It then decreases steadily to below 1% by age 35. This fall reflects a trade-
off between the bequest motive and risk aversion, on the one hand, and the increase in 
human capital, on the other.  Prior to age 35, when labour income is growing very rapidly 
and human capital is increasing, the member wishes to increase consumption and does so 
by reducing the contribution rate into the pension plan, despite being both risk averse and 
having a bequest motive.
21
  After age 35, however, labour income growth slows down 
and human capital begins to decline, and the retirement savings motive starts to become 
important. The contribution rate then increases steadily to almost 15% p.a. by age 48. 
Labour income flattens out after age 48 (see Figure 2.1) and the contribution rate then 
remains roughly constant until retirement.  
 
 
                                                 
21
 Note that pension contributions will fall by less than the contribution rate since income is growing. 
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Figure 3.6 – Optimal contribution rate 
 
 
The most interesting finding from Figure 3.6 is that the optimal contribution rate in a DC 
pension plan is age-related, rather than constant.  It exhibits a U-shaped pattern between 
age 20 and age 48 and it is only (approximately) constant after age 48. As a consequence, 
the contribution rate is very variable, ranging from, in the case of the mean profile, below 
1% (at age 35) to almost 15% (at ages 48 and above). The other quantiles have a very 
similar shape: they are relatively close to the mean during the U-shaped phase, but have a 
wider range of post-age-48 constant rates (ranging between 10 and 20%).   
 
An age-related pattern of contribution rates is not common in real-world DC plans: for 
example, in the UK, there is typically a fixed standard (combined employer and 
employee) contribution rate varying between 8 and 10% (GAD (2006, Table 8.2)). 
Although age-related contribution rates are not common, minimum contributions are 
more so. Figure 3.7 illustrates the mean optimal contribution rate over the life cycle when 
a lower limit of 5% p.a. is imposed on the contribution rate (the original unconstrained 
mean contribution rate profile is shown for comparison). In this case, the member 
accumulates greater pension wealth when young and, therefore, can afford a lower 
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contribution rate as retirement approaches. Further, because of the higher accumulated 
pension wealth, the member switches to the risk-free asset earlier, as shown in Figure 3.8 
(the original unconstrained mean optimal asset allocation is shown for comparison).. 
Nevertheless, there is a cost from imposing this constraint: expected utility at age 20 
drops by around 1% (from 2.349 to 2.329).  
 
Figure 3.7 – Mean optimal contribution rate (with lower limit on contribution rate of 5% 
per annum, shown as dotted line) 
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Figure 3.8 – Mean optimal equity allocation (with lower limit on contribution rate of 5% 
per annum, shown as dotted line) 
 
 
 
3.2 Sensitivity analysis 
In this section, we conduct a sensitivity analysis on the key parameters in the model. 
 
3.2.1 RRA and EIS 
We begin by examining simulation results for plan members with different RRA and EIS. 
As shown in Table 3.1 (see also Table 1.1), we have four types: 
● low RRA and low EIS (Type 1): 
o risk-tolerant member who dislikes consumption volatility over time 
o e.g., low income member without dependants 
● low RRA and high EIS (Type 2): 
o risk-tolerant member who does not mind consumption volatility over time 
o e.g., high income member without dependants 
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● high RRA and low EIS (Type 3): 
o risk-averse member who dislikes consumption volatility over time 
o e.g., low income member with dependants 
● high RRA and high EIS (Type 4): 
o risk-averse member who does not mind consumption volatility over time 
o e.g., high income member with dependants 
 
The baseline case in Section 3.1 dealt with Type 3 (highlighted in Table 3.1), a member 
with a high RRA and a low EIS (i.e., 5=γ  and 0.2=ϕ ). 
 
 
Table 3.1 RRA and EIS values for the different types of plan member 
 
 RRA, γ  EIS, ϕ  
Type 1 2 0.2 
   
Type 2 2 0.5 
   
Type 3 5 0.2 
   
Type 4 5 0.5 
  
 
 
Figure 3.9 shows the different patterns of optimal contribution rates corresponding to 
these four types. For risk-tolerant members with low RRA (i.e., Types 1 and 2), 
contributions prior to age 50 are negligible. From age 50 or so, the retirement savings 
motive kicks in and contributions into the pension plan begin. The contribution rate is 
lower for Type 1 (low EIS) than for Type 2 (high EIS) members (by approximately 3-4% 
p.a.). This lower retirement savings intensity is the result of a stronger aversion to cutting 
consumption: due to the lower EIS level, cuts in consumption needed to fund the pension 
plan are more heavily penalised in the utility function of Type 1 members than of Type 2 
members. 
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Figure 3.9 – Mean optimal contribution rate (for different RRA/EIS combinations) 
 
 
As a result of the lower mean contribution rates (particularly at younger ages), risk-
tolerant members, ceteris paribus, accumulate a lower level of pension wealth. They 
therefore need (and are, of course, willing to accept) a much higher average equity 
weighting (and the corresponding equity premium) in the financial portfolio in an attempt 
to produce the desired level of retirement savings. As shown in Figure 3.10, the mean 
equity allocation decreases only gradually and still exceeds 70% at retirement. The risk-
tolerant member with a low EIS level (i.e., Type 1) chooses a higher equity weighting at 
retirement (by approximately 10%) than the risk-tolerant member with a high EIS level 
(i.e., Type 2). This is because, as discussed above, the annual contribution rate is lower 
and the reliance on the equity premium correspondingly greater.  
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Figure 3.10 – Mean optimal equity allocation (for different RRA/EIS combinations) 
 
 
For risk-averse members with high RRA (i.e., Types 3 and 4), Figure 3.9 shows that the 
bequest motive leads to much larger initial contributions (in excess of 7% p.a. at age 20 
on average) than for members with low RRA, and the retirement savings motive leads to 
a significant rise in contributions after age 40, again compared with low RRA members. 
For those risk-averse members with low EIS (i.e., Type 3), the variability of the 
contribution rate over the working life is much less pronounced  than is the case for those 
risk-averse members with high EIS (i.e., Type 4). The contribution rate is also lower 
particularly at very young and very old ages (e.g., by around 5% p.a. at both age 20 and 
60 on average). The explanation is the same as given above (i.e., the reluctance of 
members with a lower EIS level to tolerate cuts in current consumption to fund future 
consumption in retirement). The fall in the contribution rate to an average of around 1% 
between age 20 and age 35 for risk averse members is explained by the increase in human 
capital over this period which increases the desire for current consumption at the expense 
of saving for retirement. 
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As a result of higher contribution rates, risk-averse members accumulate a much higher 
level of pension wealth and, as can be seen in Figure 3.10, switch away from equities 
much earlier (from about age 40) and hold less than 10% of the pension fund in equities 
at retirement on average.  
 
For a given level of risk aversion, Figure 3.10 shows that a lower EIS leads to a higher 
equity weighting during the later stages of the accumulation phase of the pension plan. At 
first sight, this finding seems counterintuitive: surely individuals with a lower IES would 
prefer a lower equity weighting in their pension fund and hence more stable contributions 
over time? Constantinides (1990), for example, appeals to habit formation (i.e., the 
complementarity between consumption in adjacent periods) for inducing a strong desire 
for stable consumption and a correspondingly low demand for equities. However, in our 
model, the retirement saving motive is important, since the only source of post-retirement 
consumption in our model comes from the pension plan. During the accumulation phase, 
a member with a low EIS is not willing to reduce current consumption in order to 
increase plan contributions (to meet the retirement saving motive), but is willing to use a 
higher equity weighting and the corresponding equity premium in an attempt to generate 
the necessary retirement savings. Figure 3.10 shows that the retirement savings effect 
dominates the habit formation effect in determining the equity weighting in the later 
years of the accumulation phase (Gomes and Michaelides (2005) derived the same result). 
 
3.2.2 Bequest motive 
Investors with a desire to bequest wealth to their dependants on death would be expected 
to save more than those who do not. Figure 3.11 shows the mean optimal pattern of 
contribution rates for the baseline case of  5γ =  and 0.2ϕ =  and different bequest 
intensities. When the bequest motive is absent (b = 0), members consume almost all of 
their earnings in the early years of their working lives, and have very negligible 
contributions into their pension plans. By contrast, members with a high bequest intensity 
(b = 2.5) make very high contributions in the early years (14% at age 20). They also 
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make higher contributions throughout their working lives,
22
 but the differences after age 
35 are much less.  
 
Figure 3.12 shows that the optimal equity weight in the portfolio is lower, the higher the 
bequest intensity. However, the effect is small because: first, the mortality rate does not 
vary much before retirement, and second, and more importantly, the annuitisation ratio (k) 
is a control variable in our model and, thus, a member with a high bequest intensity could 
choose to annuitise a smaller ratio of the pension fund at retirement, instead of assuming 
significant equity risk in an attempt to accumulate more wealth prior to retirement.
23
 
 
Figure 3.11 – Mean optimal contribution rate (for different levels of bequest motive) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22 Although it is still pulled down to below 1% between ages 20 and 35 by the effect of the increase in human capital. 
23 This is confirmed in Table 3.2 below. 
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Figure 3.12 – Mean optimal equity allocation (for different levels of bequest motive) 
 
 
 
3.2.3 Personal discount factor 
Figures 3.13 and 3.14 show the outcome from conducting a sensitivity analysis on β , the 
individual’s personal discount factor, on the mean optimal contribution rate and asset 
allocation. 
 
Individuals with a low personal discount factor (or high personal discount rate) value 
current consumption more highly than future consumption in comparison with 
individuals with a high personal discount factor. This will lead, ceteris paribus, to a 
lower contribution rate into the pension plan as shown in Figure 3.13.  There will be a 
correspondingly slower accumulation of financial wealth and therefore a higher ratio of 
human to financial wealth throughout the working life. This, in turn, leads to an optimal 
lifestyle strategy with a higher portfolio allocation to the risky asset throughout the 
working life, together with a shorter switching period, as shown in Figure 3.14.   
Figure 3.13 – Mean optimal contribution rate (for different levels of personal discount 
factor, β ) 
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Figure 3.14 – Mean optimal equity allocation (for different levels of personal discount 
factor, β ) 
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3.2.4 Correlation between labour income growth and equity returns 
In our model, the degree of correlation between labour income growth and equity returns 
is determined by ( )2 21 1 2+σ σ σ .  When this correlation coefficient is high, human 
capital and financial wealth will also be highly correlated. Although the ratio of human 
capital to financial wealth will fall over the life cycle, it will do so more gradually when 
the correlation coefficient is high than when it is low. As discussed earlier, this ratio is a 
crucial determinant of portfolio composition over the life cycle: as it falls, so does the 
optimal weight in equities. A more gradual decline in the ratio of human capital to 
financial wealth will lead to a more gradual switch from equities to the risk-free financial 
asset.  
 
We assume a high correlation of 0.93 in our baseline case. Figures 3.15 and 3.16 show 
the outcomes from conducting a sensitivity analysis on this correlation coefficient: we 
lowered it to 0.70.  The lower correlation coefficient has a negligible effect on the 
optimal contribution rate (Figure 3.15), but leads to a later and steeper switch away from 
equities (Figure 3.16). 
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Figure 3.15 – Mean optimal contribution rate (for different levels of correlation between 
labour income and equity returns) 
 
 
Figure 3.16 – Mean optimal equity allocation (for different levels of correlation between 
labour income and equity returns) 
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3.2.5 Salary growth rate 
Finally, Figure 3.17 shows the effect on the mean optimal equity allocation of increasing 
the average annual real rate of salary growth, Ir , from 2% to 5%. The optimal equity 
weighting is lower at most ages.  
 
Figure 3.17 – Mean optimal equity allocation (different average annual real rate of salary 
growth rates) 
 
 
3.2.6 Annuitisation ratio 
Although the annuitisation ratio, k, is part of the budget constraint not the utility function, 
it is still a control variable in our model, and is chosen to maximise ( )64E V , conditional 
on the values for RAA, EIS and the personal discount factor (see Section 2.1.5 above). 
Table 3.2 shows the mean optimal values of k corresponding to different values for RAA, 
EIS and the personal discount factors. 
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There is a positive relationship between RAA and the annuitisation ratio, k, and also 
between EIS and k, although the relationship in each case is not very strong. There is, 
unsurprisingly, a much stronger relationship between the bequest intensity, b, and k. 
When there is no bequest motive, the member annuitises the largest ratio (99.35%) of his 
pension wealth.
24
 According to Yaari (1965), when there is no bequest motive, the 
member should annuitise the entire accumulated pension fund at retirement. Davidoff et 
al (2005) extend Yaari’s framework to include imperfect credit markets and habit 
formation (i.e., a low IES) and show it is optimal to annuitise less than 100% of wealth, 
but the optimal proportion is still very high. We find that this is the case even when we 
impose a significant reduction in the discount factor, β . A discount factor of 0.9, 
implying a very high personal discount rate of 10% (and very strong preference for 
current over future consumption) only reduces the optimal annuitisation ratio to 88%.  
 
Table 3.2  The effect of the preference parameters on the mean optimal annuitisation ratio 
Preference parameter Optimal annuitisation ratio (mean %) 
RRA, γ   
2 93.17 
5 94.72 
EIS, ϕ   
0.2 94.72 
0.5 95.88 
Bequest intensity, b  
0.0 99.35 
1.0 94.72 
2.5 90.03 
Discount factor, β   
0.90 87.66 
0.96 94.72 
0.99 96.43 
  
Note: All parameters are at their baseline values (see Table 2.1) unless otherwise stated 
                                                 
24
 We obtain a value of 99.35% when the bequest motive is zero (rather than the expected 100%) due to the numerical 
methods used to solve the problem and the estimation error caused by interpolation approximations. 
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4 Conclusion 
In this paper, we have examined optimal funding and investment strategies in a DC 
pension plan using a life-cycle model that has been extended in three significant ways: 
(i) the assumption of Epstein-Zin recursive preferences by the plan member which 
enables a separation between the RRA and EIS, 
(ii) the introduction of human capital as an asset class along with financial assets, 
such as equities and cash, and 
(iii) endogenising the decision about how much to annuitise at retirement. 
 
We also considered two important motives for saving: bequest and retirement. In addition, 
a plan member’s personal discount rate influenced the optimal strategies. 
 
We found that the optimal funding strategy typically exhibits a U-shaped pattern for the 
contribution rate in early working life and then stabilises in the period leading up to 
retirement. The initial high level is explained by a high bequest intensity combined with a 
high degree of risk aversion. The falling part of the U is explained by the increase in 
human capital inducing an increase in consumption at the expense of savings, while the 
rising part of the U is explained by the retirement savings motive. A higher personal 
discount rate lowers contributions at each age, while preserving the general shape of the 
optimal contribution profile. A lower bequest intensity reduces contributions to the 
pension plan in early career and in the extreme case of a zero bequest intensity 
completely eliminates them until mid-career when the retirement savings motive kicks in. 
The effect of lower risk aversion is to delay the start of contributions into the pension 
plan: contributions do not begin until late in the working life, but then increase steadily 
until the retirement age. The effect of lower EIS is to reduce contributions into the plan at 
all ages, since members with low EIS are reluctant to accept cuts in consumption to “pay 
for” the pension contributions.  
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We found that the optimal investment strategy is stochastic lifestyling rather than the 
more conventional deterministic lifestyling. While the optimal weighting in equities is 
initially very high and subsequently declines as the retirement date approaches, it does 
not do so in a predetermined manner as in the case of deterministic lifestyling. Instead the 
optimal equity weighting over the life cycle depends on the realisations of the stochastic 
processes determining labour income and equity returns. Stochastic lifestyling is justified 
by recognising the importance of human capital and interpreting it as a bond-like asset 
which deteriorates over the working life. An initial high weighting in equities is intended 
to counterbalance human capital in the combined “portfolio” of human capital and 
pension wealth. In time, the weighting in equities falls, while that in bonds rises as human 
capital decays over time. When the correlation between labour income and equity returns 
is high, human capital and pension wealth will also be more highly correlated; the 
optimal switch away from equities over the life cycle will therefore be later and steeper.  
 
The size of the pension fund is a crucial determinant of the optimal asset allocation. The 
greater the pension wealth accumulated, the more conservative the optimal asset 
allocation strategy will be, for a given RAA, EIS and discount rate. Also, the higher the 
contribution rate, the earlier the switch out of equities can be made. In our model, risk-
tolerant members who value both current consumption over future consumption as 
smooth consumption profiles over time (i.e., have a low RRA, a high discount rate and a 
low EIS) accumulate the lowest pension wealth levels and therefore need to adopt the 
most aggressive investment strategy. 
 
Finally, we found that the optimal annuitisation ratio was typically very high, suggesting 
that longevity protection is a hugely valuable feature of a well-defined DC pension plan 
to a rational consumer. It was negatively related to the bequest intensity and the discount 
rate, but not very sensitive to RRA or EIS. 
 
The results in this paper have some important implications for the optimal design of DC 
pension plans: 
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● An investment strategy involving a switch from equities to bonds as members 
approach retirement is appropriate for DC pension plans, even when equity 
returns are not mean reverting. However, the switch out from equities is not 
predetermined, but depends on what happens to equity returns. Nevertheless, 
the switch should typically be made earlier than in traditional lifestyle 
strategies (i.e., from age 45 or so rather than age 55, which is more common 
in practice). Also, the optimal equity weight in the portfolio typically never 
reduces to zero (even immediately prior to retirement), as is common in 
traditional lifestyle strategies. 
 
● It is very important to incorporate the salary process in the optimal design of a 
DC pension plan.
25
 For most people, their human capital will be bond-like in 
nature and this will have a direct impact on the optimal contribution rate and 
asset allocation decisions, in particular, justifying a high weight for equities in 
the pension plan.  However, for senior plan members whose salary levels 
(including bonus and dividends from their own stock holdings) may have a 
strong link with corporate profitability, their labour income growth rate may 
be much higher than the risk-free rate of return and also be more volatile. In 
this case, their human capital asset will be more equity-like in nature and so 
the optimal investment strategy will be more geared towards the risk-free 
asset (as shown in Figure 3.17).  
 
● The results provide some justification for age-related contribution rates in DC 
plans. Because members tend to prefer relatively smoothed consumption 
growth, a plan design involving a lower contribution rate (e.g., 5% p.a. or less) 
when members are young, and a gradually increasing contribution rate as 
members get older (reaching on average 15% p.a. in the period prior to 
retirement) offers higher expected utility than fixed age-independent 
contribution rates. Greater contribution rate flexibility will be especially 
welcomed by members with high EIS. Such members are more sensitive to 
                                                 
25 This was first pointed out by Blake et al (2007). 
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changes in financial incentives and thus are more desirous of flexible 
contribution rates. If they were allowed to make additional voluntary 
contributions (AVCs), the optimal asset allocation strategy would actually 
become more conservative as they approach retirement. 
 
● An annuity is an important component of a well-designed plan. The optimal 
annuitisation ratio is very high, even when there is a strong bequest motive 
and the plan member values current consumption highly. This is true despite 
the well-known aversion to annuitisation documented in Friedman and 
Warshawsky (1990) and Mitchell et al (1999). 
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Appendix 1 - Numerical solution for the dynamic programming and 
integration process  
 
The Epstein-Zin utility function at time t  is as follows: 
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In the last period ( )1,ω ω− , where 1 0ω− =p , the terminal value function is given by: 
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The optimisation problem is then: 
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The Bellman equation is given by: 
(a) for 430 ≤≤ t , we have: 
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(b) for 44=t , we have: 
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(c) and, for 45≥t , we have: 
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To solve the non-linear expectation part in the Bellman equation above, i.e., ( )120 20 1γ−+ + +t tE J , 
Gauss-Hermite quadrature is used to discretise 1Z and 2Z  into 9 nodes, and the procedure 
of discretising 1Z  and 2Z  is to substitute 1,2 mZ  and 2,2 nZ  for them respectively. 
So, we have: 
( ) ( )
1, 2,
9 9 1
1 1
20 20 1 20 1 1, 2, 20 1, 20 1
1 1
2 , 2 ;
γ
γ π
−
− −
+ + + + + + + + +
= =
 ≈
 ∑∑ m nt t Z Z t m n t t
m n
E J w w J Z Z W Y  
where 
1,mZ
w , 
2,nZ
w and 1,mZ , 2,nZ  are the Gauss-Hermite quadrature weights and nodes, 
and π  is the mathematical constant.  
 
To avoid choosing a local maximum, we discretise both control variables (i.e., 
consumption and asset allocation) into 20 equally-spaced grids and optimise using a 
standard grid search. Wealth and labour income level are discretised in 30 and 10 
equally-spaced grids, respectively. 
 
Substituting the expectation with the Gauss-Hermite approximated function in the 
Bellman equation at time t , we compute the maximum value function and optimal 
variables at each grid point.  We then iterate the procedure back to age 20. For a point in 
the state space other than grid points, cubic spline interpolation is employed to 
approximate the optimal results. 
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